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The Supreme Court’s 2012 term produced two decisions driven by odd 
federalism analyses.  First, in Shelby County v. Holder,1 the Court struck down 
a key provision of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), partially on the basis of “the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” 2 —that is, the idea that equal 
treatment of the states is, at some level, constitutionally required.  Second, the 
                                                 
 + Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. I would like to thank 
Richard Posner, my recent personal correspondence with whom largely inspired this project. I 
would also like to thank Professors Allen Rostron, Doug Linder, Nancy Levit, Barbara Glesner-
Fines, Evan Caminker, and Gary Lawson for their helpful comments on drafts. 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 2624. 
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Court in United States v. Windsor, 3  using a strange explication of equal 
protection doctrine infused with federalism concerns, struck down a provision 
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that denied same-sex married couples 
various tax benefits under federal law.4 
Scholars have labored to make sense of both decisions by superimposing over 
them well-worn doctrinal and theoretical templates.5  Such efforts seem forced, 
as the decisions do not fit neatly into readily available conceptual boxes.  One 
plausible reason for the less-than-persuasive nature of early academic responses 
is a general inattention to how these decisions may be specimens of a prudential 
approach to federalism qualitatively different from that to which scholars are 
accustomed. -The Court’s Windsor and Shelby County decisions arguably 
represent a wholesale, even if incipient and slow-motion, transition in the 
Court’s federalism approach away from a focus on state regulatory power and 
toward what is termed herein “penumbral federalism.”  This approach is 
characterized by an emphasis on the states as deserving of respect and prestige, 
with the ultimate goal of sustaining the states as worthy competitors for citizens’ 
loyalty. 
The 2012 term is thus a tentative invitation for scholars to recalibrate the 
scopes through which they detect and interpret incremental changes in structural 
doctrine.  This recalibration is necessary to prepare scholars for the Court’s 
increasing invocation of ethereal concepts such as “state dignity” and others that 
are in the “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment responses to the Roberts Court’s 
Federalism jurisprudence though not textually manifest in it. A crucial part of 
that preparation is understanding why the Court employs these penumbral 
conceptualisms.  As such, this Article focuses heavily not only on explaining 
what penumbral federalism is and how it has manifested in case law, but also on 
teasing out the likely reasons for its prudential appeal. 
This Article does not seek to defend either the Court’s recent federalism 
explications or penumbral federalism more generally.  Indeed, the author is 
persuaded neither as to the historical importance of “state dignity” nor as to the 
correctness of the decisions in which the Court invokes it.  However, by 
discussing penumbral federalism’s prudential appeal, the Article urges scholars 
to intellectually empathize with those who appear to adopt this approach, if not 
for any other reason than to enable us to foresee possible changes in federalism 
doctrine’s trajectory in the coming years, and to adequately explain those 
changes to our students using more than glib references to “law as raw politics.”6 
                                                 
 3. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 4. Id. at 269596. 
 5. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining 
Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 46 (2013) [hereinafter Young, Defining Rights].  See 
also infra notes 17881. 
 6. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1147 
(1988) (“[I]t would be a reductionist mistake to view federal courts arguments as nearly always 
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The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces penumbral federalism by 
briefly contrasting it with more traditional approaches to federalism analyses, 
expounding on its conceptual bases, and highlighting the likely reasons for its 
prudential appeal.  Part I’s ultimate task is to illustrate why the penumbral 
approach to federalism is a realistic, descriptive account for how federalism 
concerns may play on the judicial mind, and thus manifest in Court decisions.  
After contextualizing penumbral federalism on a more abstract level in Part I, 
Part II describes penumbral federalism’s jurisprudential trajectory over the past 
several decades.  Part III ultimately focuses on how 2012 decisions help further 
reveal this trajectory as one headed toward a general shift in—or permutation 
of—federalism doctrine. 
I.  PENUMBRAL FEDERALISM: AN ATTITUDINAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
When the Rehnquist Court ostensibly sought to reinvigorate federalism 
through decisions such as United States v. Lopez 7  and United States v. 
Morrison,8 it faced charges of conservative judicial activism.  For example, in 
2000, Professor Larry Kramer declared that “conservative judicial activism is 
the order of the day” because, among other things, the Court had “cast aside 
nearly 70 years of precedent in the area of federalism.”9  Hindsight, however, 
reveals that the “dual federalism” into which the Rehnquist Court allegedly 
sought to breathe life—that is, the traditional notion that states enjoy an 
exclusive sphere of regulatory turf—has gone, and is going, nowhere.  Thus, 
scholars such as Ernie Young have declared that “[d]ual federalism remains 
hardly less dead than it was the day after the Court decided Wickard v. 
Filburn.”10 
Nevertheless, the conservative justices on the Roberts Court are assumed, 
correctly, to want to keep the federalism flame burning.  But in what form?  Nine 
years into John Roberts’ term as Chief Justice his Court has arguably not handed 
down one decision meaningfully curtailing Congress’ regulatory reach under its 
most oft-invoked source of power, the Commerce Clause.11  Therefore, most 
                                                 
being crudely political ones in which judges and theorists claim for their predilections the status of 
the law.”). 
 7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 8. 528 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 9. Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It’s an Activist Court., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A33. 
See also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles 
of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 185 (2001) (labeling as 
“conservative judicial activism” the Rehnquist Court’s “recent line of federalism decisions,” and 
describing them as “lawless and indefensible from the standpoint of pre-1987 jurisprudence”). 
 10. Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY 34, 34 (2014) [hereinafter Young, Puzzling], available at http://scholarship. 
law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2689/. 
 11. The contrarian might pounce with Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012), wherein the Court declared that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce 
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agree that decisions such as Lopez and Morrison have enjoyed little doctrinal 
momentum.12  The upshot is that these dual federalism decisions have proven to 
be of decreasing importance in understanding how federalism concerns 
influence modern case outcomes.13 
More relevant to understanding what is perhaps a slow-motion revolution in 
federalism jurisprudence is a focus on the vague and ethereal conceptualizing of 
federalism principles, such as “state dignity,” conspicuous in recent decisions.  
While the Court’s explications of federalism in these cases seem unconvincing 
when viewed through traditional theoretical prisms, they make greater sense if 
viewed as products of a “penumbral” view of federalism.  This Article employs 
the phrase “penumbral federalism” because it best reflects the attitudinal 
preconception of the Tenth Amendment that allows one to take notions such as 
“equal sovereignty” and “state dignity” seriously.  In this sense, it is similar to 
the substantive due process reasoning in decisions such as Griswold v. 
Connecticut,14 in that it has tenuous textual roots, but nevertheless is plausible 
under an interpretive approach that views the amendments as not only declaring 
express mandates but also providing formal recognition of fundamental values 
of political morality and constitutional idealism. -To those who either 
consciously, or at least viscerally, approach federalism this way, state dignity 
plausibly yields from the “penumbras and emanations” 15  of the Tenth 
Amendment. 
Current intellectual fashion detrimentally fails to appreciate the importance of 
concepts such as state dignity in the minds of those most likely to embrace them, 
even if coyly or experimentally—judges, who are charged with the practical task 
of paying due respect to all aspects of the Constitution while issuing decisions 
that do not stifle pragmatic governance with an unacceptable degree of doctrinal 
rigidity.  In light of the need to negotiate these various pressures, and the 
increasing obviousness that dual federalism is going nowhere due to the ever-
increasing nationalization of criminal law and other areas of traditional state 
concern, it is likely that penumbral concepts will increasingly animate much of 
the Court’s federalism jurisprudence—either expressly or through a fair 
reconstruction of the Court’s opinions.  To appreciate the distinction between 
                                                 
Clause to require citizens to purchase health insurance.  This holding, however, is of extremely 
limited consequence given the unique context of compelled commerce, a mechanism unusual in 
federal law.  See id. at 2648.  Indeed, this holding was even inconsequential in the case itself, as 
the Court ultimately concluded that the so-called “individual mandate” was nevertheless a valid 
exercise of Congress’ power to tax.  Id. at 2601. 
 12. See, e.g., Young, Puzzling, supra note 10, at 34 (“I would think that by now the Court has 
made clear that it does not mean to impose particularly significant limits on the Commerce Clause, 
much less to bring back the entire dual federalist regime.”). 
 13. See id. at 5556. 
 14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 15. Id. at 484 (noting that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance,” and thus yield a right 
to privacy in certain contexts). 
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traditional approaches to federalism analysis and the penumbral approach, an 
explanation of each, and a comparison between them, is in order. 
A.  Federalism: The Usual Suspects 
Debates over the legitimacy of decisions such as Shelby County and 
Windsor—debates that are rightly impassioned given the significant individual 
rights and social justice implications of the decisions—reflect the decades-old 
tension in case law and legal scholarship between two opposing starting points 
for federalism analysis.  These analytical points of departure are perhaps best 
characterized not so much as federalism “theories” or “paradigms,” but rather as 
attitudinal federalism priors. 
For example, when the Shelby County Court invoked “equal sovereignty” in 
striking down a part of the VRA, even conservative scholars were incredulous.  
Michael McConnell, for example, charged that Justice Roberts simply “made 
up” the doctrine of “equal sovereignty.”16  The legitimacy of the concept was 
even less plausible to those more liberal leaning; according to one scholar on the 
left, the Court’s prudential conjuring is part of a larger war the conservative 
justices are waging on progressive legislation and goals.17 
Though federalism-sympathetic and federalism-ambivalent thinkers made 
strange bedfellows with regard to Shelby County, both approaches are generally 
framed by differing characterizations of states’ and Congress’ respective 
regulatory subject-matter provinces.  This makes sense given that the allocation 
of regulatory territory traditionally has been the central issue in federalism 
disputes.18  Understanding these two framings of federalism, then, is necessary 
to appreciating federalism. 
1.  The Residual Federalism Approach 
The first general approach to federalism is to view state power as nothing but 
what remains once positive grants of federal power reach their logical ends.  
Thus, once we define “interstate commerce”19 and couple it with a reasonable 
formulation of “necessary and proper,”20 any exercise of power that does not fit 
under this conceptual umbrella is, by default, within the regulatory province of 
the states.  Herein, this is termed “residual federalism.”  This approach is not 
                                                 
 16. See Nina Totenberg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back At The Supreme Court, NPR (July 
5, 2013, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back-
at-the-supreme-court (former Tenth Circuit judge, appointed by George W. Bush, declaring that 
“equal sovereignty” was “made up” rather than constitutionally mandated). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, 
at A25 (describing Shelby County as part of Roberts’ “long game” of “tee[ing] up major 
constitutional issues for dramatic reversal”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (using the phrase “[c]ommerce . . . among the several states”). 
 20. Id. 
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usually framed in these terms, or referred to with this label, but examples of it 
abound; the most famous is probably Justice Stone’s characterization of the 
Tenth Amendment as “but a truism” in United States v. Darby.21  Scholars who 
do not adopt the dual federalism model discussed below effectively default to 
this residual approach, which is perhaps best exemplified by Professor Aviam 
Soifer’s assertion that “there exists no interpretation based upon constitutional 
structure to establish workable limitations on Congress’ authority to act for what 
Congress believes to be the public good, except for limitations premised on the 
rights of individuals protected elsewhere in the Constitution.”22 
Another good example of residual federalism is Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Printz v. United States,23 discussed in further detail below.  Important for present 
purposes is that the federal law at issue required state officials to effectuate 
federal law; that is, the federal law “commandeered” state officials for federal 
use. 24   The Court ruled the relevant law unconstitutional on federalism 
grounds.25  In dissent Justice Stevens argued: 
Unlike the First Amendment, which prohibits the enactment of a 
category of laws that would otherwise be authorized by Article I, the 
Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated 
powers. . . . [Thus, t]he [Tenth] Amendment confirms the principle 
that the powers of the Federal Government are limited to those 
affirmatively granted by the Constitution, but it does not purport to 
limit the scope or the effectiveness of the exercise of powers that are 
delegated to Congress.26 
Stevens’ background premise was that state sovereignty is defined solely by 
the logical corollaries of Article I’s language read in a vacuum (except for being 
                                                 
 21. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).  The Darby Court asserted: 
The [Tenth A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. . . . From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been 
construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for 
the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the 
permitted end. 
Id. at 124. 
 22. Aviam Soifer, Truisms that Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending 
Power, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 81112 (1986).  See also id. at 795 n.7 (referring to the alternative 
dual federalist approach as an “anachronistic battlement”). 
 23. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 24. Id. at 92533.  See also id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 935. 
 26. Id. at 94142 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority rejected this reasoning, employing 
the dual federalism approach discussed below, responding: 
When a [l]aw . . . for carrying into [e]xecution the Commerce Clause violates the 
principle of state sovereignty reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions . . . it is 
not . . . proper for carrying into [e]xecution the Commerce Clause, and is thus . . . merely 
an act of usurpation which deserves to be treated as such. 
Id. at 92324 (internal citation and quotations marks omitted). 
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limited by individual rights provisions). 27   Unlike in the First Amendment 
context, that logic is not constrained by conceptions of state sovereignty 
extrinsic to Article I. 
Residual federalism also played prominently in post-Shelby County reactions 
by scholars such as Sandy Levinson.  The Court ruled that the challenged 
provision of the VRA exceeded Congress’ power under the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s enforcement provision. According to Levinson, “the Constitution 
expressly . . . grant[s] Congress the power to engage in all appropriate legislation 
to enforce the [Fifteenth] Amendment’s guarantee that the right to vote will not 
be denied because of race. So[,] the [Tenth] Amendment has nothing whatsoever 
to do with the [Shelby County] case.” 28   Levinson’s implicit premise is 
seemingly that because the remedial provision of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, can easily be read to 
conceptually legitimize the relevant aspects of the VRA, the Tenth Amendment 
by definition never comes into play.  Under this view, the Tenth Amendment is 
almost condescendingly descriptive, rather than profoundly prescriptive.  That 
is, Levinson treats the Tenth Amendment in this context as merely asserting that 
federal regulatory overreach means federal conduct that cannot be reconciled 
with language of Article I positively defining the breadth of congressional 
powers granted.  Such a reading of the Tenth Amendment as merely a 
recognition that federal overreach conceptually exists is in contrast to viewing 
the Tenth Amendment as helping to define what federal overreach is. 
2.  The Dual Federalism Approach 
The second general approach to federalism—often termed “dual federalism”29 
or “enclave federalism”30—takes the view that the Tenth Amendment defines 
state sovereignty not simply as the “left overs” from unsuccessful federal grasps 
at power, but rather as a recognition that there exist “spheres” or “enclaves” of 
affairs that, by their nature, are of “traditional state concern,” and therefore fall 
within states’ exclusive regulatory province.31  The firm boundaries of the given 
                                                 
 27. Id. at 94142 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 28. Sandy Levinson, Tendentious, Mendacious or Audacious? John Roberts Rewrites the 10th 
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/tendentious-
mendacious-or-audacious.html. 
 29. See generally Young, Puzzling, supra note 10, at 36. 
 30. See Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2133, 2133 (2006) (“Dual federalism [is] the idea that the national government and the 
states enjoy exclusive and nonoverlapping spheres of authority . . . .”); Soifer, supra note 22, at 
79495 (referring to this approach as embodying a belief that the “[T]enth [A]mendment creates 
an enclave for state authority”). 
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized the possession of firearms in school zones, because 
it infringed on “areas of traditional state concern” and blurred the “boundaries between the spheres 
of federal and state authority”). 
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state-power enclave32 hold fast against Article I grants of federal power that 
might otherwise run arrogantly into logical infinity through the inertia of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, a clause Justice Scalia characteristically termed 
the “last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.”33 
The logic driving this framing is similar to that uncontroversially applied to, 
say, the First Amendment with regard to free speech.  In determining whether a 
law violates the Speech Clause, courts do not—and, most agree, should not—
begin and end with the question of whether the given law can reasonably be 
deemed “necessary and proper”—that is, “rationally related”34—to effectuating 
a valid federal goal.  Rather, while no right is absolute, in the First Amendment 
context most scholars generally find implicit therein the natural-rights notion of 
the inherent inalienability of the right to expression.35  This results in approaches 
like that of Justice Stevens in Printz, discussed above, which treats individual 
rights provisions as more legally dynamic than the Tenth Amendment. -
Likewise, the dual federalist reads the Tenth Amendment as a recognition that 
certain spheres of life, though unenumerated in the Tenth Amendment, are only 
of state concern.  Therefore, regardless of their logical relationship to a power 
enumerated in Article I, allowing federal regulation of such matters is to employ 
an interpretive approach that proves too much. 
These two major approaches to federalism are palatable to those—mostly 
academics—not responsible for enforcing them with real-world consequences.  
Residual federalism presents the specter of making federalism virtually 
meaningless through the forgiving logic of current Necessary and Proper 
jurisprudence, thereby compromising the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy, a 
presumably real concern for most judges. Conversely, the dual federalism 
approach is simply too unpragmatic for even generally pro-federalism scholars 
to stomach.36  The pressures of real-world judging give rise to a federalism 
approach that academics have largely failed to digest.  This failure, as rooted as 
it may be in the dubious pedigree or normative non-persuasiveness of penumbral 
                                                 
 32. Or as Justice Holmes mockingly put it, the “invisible radiation[s] from the Tenth 
Amendment.”  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
 33. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). 
 34. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (citing Sabri v. United States, 
541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)) (“[I]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations and 
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (1999) (noting that “eighteenth-
century Americans understood freedom of speech within the framework of natural rights theory,” 
and advocating viewing free-speech rights in natural rights terms). 
 36. See, e.g., Young, Puzzling, supra note 10, at 64 (demonstrating one federalism-
sympathetic scholar’s  assertion that dual federalism “must fail” because “exclusive spheres of 
authority simply cannot be defined and maintained in a principled way”). 
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federalism, needlessly delays scholars’ eventual coming to terms with it as one 
increasingly lurking between the lines in court opinions. 
B.  Penumbral Federalism 
Understanding the penumbral approach to federalism requires not only a 
conceptual unpacking of the attitude itself but also an examination of why the 
Court—or perhaps more specifically, federalism-vigilant personalities on it—
would feel compelled in recent decades to gravitate away from the Tenth 
Amendment’s core and toward the Amendment’s more peripheral and pragmatic 
aura.  This section is thus devoted to, first, expounding on the theoretical and 
attitudinal bases for penumbral federalism, and, second, highlighting the likely 
reasons for its prudential appeal.  These two discussions at once help one to 
intellectually empathize with a judge who takes the penumbral approach, and 
also sets the groundwork for justifying the characterization herein of various 
lines of jurisprudence as indeed representing penumbral federalism’s doctrinal 
fruition. 
1.  The Penumbral Tenth Amendment: Federalism as a Fundamental Value 
One who takes the penumbral view of federalism does not merely grudgingly 
accept federalism as an anachronistic but nevertheless extant mandate deserving 
of an occasional ceremonial nod.  Rather, in its purest form, the penumbral view 
treats federalism as a first principle of political morality37 and an indispensable 
part of constitutional idealism.  It is thus a cognitive petri dish for sentiments 
such as “state dignity.”  Justice Kennedy’s view of federalism best exemplifies 
this relatively purist penumbral framing; he has described federalism as 
reflecting an 
underlying, fundamental, essential, ethical, moral value . . . that it is 
wrong, legally wrong, morally wrong, for a person to delegate 
authority over his or her own life to an entity which is so far removed 
from his or her ability to control it that he or she parts with the essential 
freedom that inheres in every human personality.38 
                                                 
 37. This phrase generally refers to the values and moral premises implicit in constitutional 
text, but which must be brought into relief through interpretation.  This is akin to Professor Ronald 
Dworkin’s use of the phrase, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977), as well as Professor Robin West’s implicit definition when she states “[o]ur adjudicated 
Constitution . . . is not only a font of law, it is also our Code of Political Morality,” in that 
adjudication teases out the morality inspiring the various textual provisions, Robin West, Ennobling 
Politics, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 58, 73 (H. Jefferson Powell & James 
Boyd White eds., 2009).  See also Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2012) (discussing “reconcil[ing] the Religion Clauses with political 
morality by expanding the definition of religion to include secular ethical and moral doctrines”). 
 38. Helen J. Knowles, Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided “Quite 
Apart from Principles of Federalism”, ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
280 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:271 
This sentimentalized or moralized approach can, of course, easily foster the 
reasoning that sometimes federal conduct can be so “offensive” as to be 
obviously in violation of a sacred constitutional premise, even if reaching this 
conclusion requires a judge to work backwards to substantiate a conclusion the 
correctness of which is intuitively “obvious.” 
However, a judge need not—and usually does not—view federalism as 
literally a moral imperative to think it a “fundamental value” of healthy 
constitutionalism.  Indeed, taking Justice Kennedy’s words on their face, they 
do seem oddly zealous relative to the views of others sympathetic to federalism.  
Thus, viewing federalism as a fundamental value, even if it does not inspire 
transcendental exaltation, can inspire a judge to feel a professional responsibility 
to latch on to state dignity to invigorate federalism as much as is practicable.  
For at base, underlying the penumbral view are simply the conclusions that: (1) 
federalism is a constitutional mandate; (2) it is a good mandate; (3) the courts 
must enforce it; and (4) if it is infeasible to realize dual federalism through 
adjudication, a meaningful diffusion of power can only be maintained by 
recognizing states as worthy of respect and prestige, and thus worthy contenders 
for citizens’ loyalty.  In this sense, penumbral federalism can be easily 
understood as a consequentialist and pragmatic approach primarily concerned 
with the benefits that a structural diffusion of power yields.  It is analogous to 
the modern approach to individual rights provisions, which are often framed by 
the Court not only in natural-rights terms, but also in utilitarian terms; the 
“marketplace of ideas” in the First Amendment context comes to mind.39 
Indeed, as noted above, the penumbral approach takes center-stage most often 
in individual rights contexts.  Even to many of those who recognize that, say, 
substantive due process is a contradiction in terms—like “green pastel redness” 
as John Hart Ely quipped40—are comfortable with substantive due process 
decisions because they are consistent with the decisions’ idealized relationship 
between the state and individuals that the Constitution is fairly read to 
envisage.41  In other words, many generally have little problem accepting a 
                                                 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2560 (2012) (“Time and again, this 
Court has recognized that as a general matter false factual statements possess no intrinsic First 
Amendment value[]” because “they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of 
ideas.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 
(1980) (“Familiarity breeds inattention, and we apparently need periodic reminding that 
‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like green pastel redness.”). 
 41. This is especially understandable given tenable arguments that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to serve as a conduit for 
unenumerated “fundamental” rights.  See, e.g., Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially 
Expansive Reach of McDonald v. Chicago: Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause 2010 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 139, 140 (arguing that “the Privileges or Immunities Clause . . . was 
expressly intended by its framers to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights (including the Ninth 
Amendment, protecting unenumerated rights)”). 
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fiction such as substantive due process because it is used to advance what are 
arguably very real constitutional values.  This invariably begs the question: why 
can’t the same approach be taken with federalism? 
To one who takes a penumbral view of the Tenth Amendment, critics of 
federalism-vigilant decisions have an idiosyncratic perspective on the relative 
importance and meaning of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights—among 
which, it must be remembered, is the Tenth Amendment.  Many of the very same 
scholars who take exception to the Court’s reliance on equal sovereignty in 
Shelby County would likely applaud, say, the Court’s reliance on the notion of 
“fundamental” rights in their “more transcendent dimensions” in striking down 
Texas’ anti-sodomy law.42 
For better or for worse, the Tenth Amendment is treated by most modern 
scholars as qualitatively different than the rest of the Bill of Rights, demoted to 
a dry logistical rule at best, and a “truism” at worst, one that, according to some 
commenters, has produced a “national neurosis.”43  To one who believes that 
structural values should be enforced only when doing so will quite apparently 
protect individual rights, this makes sense: if a particular structural arrangement 
does not immediately threaten individual rights, pragmatic approval of it is in 
the spirit of the Constitution, while formalistic disapproval would be an example 
of failing to see the forest through the trees.44 
By contrast, the Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment, for example, 
represents to many an intuitively obvious statement about the morally correct 
allocation of power in adjudging the propriety of speech—in this case, between 
the individual and the state.  Provisions such as these are thought of to embody 
“first principles,” aspirational provisions meant to ensure continued recognition 
                                                 
 42. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 43. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 904 (lamenting that “[a] mere six years after its brave declaration that it had 
sworn off federalism for good, the Supreme Court suffered a relapse” and returned to paying 
federalism some due in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)). 
 44. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1525 (1990).  Brown believes that, 
to the formalist school, . . . the “forest” of individual liberty is often lost in the “trees” of 
absolute fealty to the Framers’ words. To insist upon the maintenance of an absolute 
separation [of powers] merely for the sake of doctrinal purity could severely hinder the 
quest for a workable government with no appreciable gain for the cause of liberty or 
efficiency. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of transcendental truths.45  The Tenth Amendment, on the other hand, does not 
occupy such an exalted status in the minds of most modern scholars.46 
Some scholars have expressed frustration with the disproportionate focus in 
modern scholarship on individual rights, which is arguably the product of 
scholars arbitrarily playing favorites with the Bill of Rights.  Over thirty years 
ago, Professor Robert Nagel disapprovingly contrasted Justice Brennan, the 
“respected and unapologetic practitioner of judicial power and imaginative 
constitutional analysis when the issues involve individuals’ rights,”47 with the 
Justice Brennan who labeled the Tenth Amendment reasoning in National 
League of Cities v. Usery48  “an abstraction without substance”49 and a “patent 
usurpation.”50 
In Usery, the Court held that while Congress had the general authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate the employee-employer relationship under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, it could not so regulate when the employer was a state, 
as such regulation of “[s]tates as [s]tates” interfered with state autonomy.51  
Arguing in favor of viewing federalism as a “fundamental value” rather than a 
technical mandate to perfunctorily acknowledge, Nagel noted that “[t]he harsh 
reaction to Usery is one aspect of a widespread pattern that inverts the priorities 
of the framers: an obsessive concern for using the Constitution to protect 
individuals’ rights.”52  Nagel’s point was “not to insist that Usery was ultimately 
                                                 
 45. Substantive due process probably best reflects this notion, given that it, more than any 
other doctrine, is rooted in abstract natural rights.  As Justice Blackmun argued, dissenting in a case 
later overruled using his reasoning: 
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to 
the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual’s life. 
. . . We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so 
dramatically an individual’s self-definition, not because of demographic considerations 
or the Bible’s command to be fruitful and multiply.  And we protect the family because 
it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference 
for stereotypical households. 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 20405 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 46. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National 
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1043 
(1997) (“[W]hen today’s state sovereignty plurality applies its state sovereignty theory of 
constitutional federalism, it is not enforcing the Founders’ First Principles.”). 
 47. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1989) [hereinafter NAGEL, CULTURES]. 
 48. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 531 (1985). 
 49. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 858. 
 51. Id. at 854 (majority opinion). 
 52. Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in 
Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 82 (1981) [hereinafter Nagel, Fundamental Value].  See also 
Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the 
War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 128485 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Dark Side] (noting 
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‘correct,’ but to suggest that the inability to understand Usery demonstrates the 
extent to which the capacity to appreciate some important constitutional 
principles is being lost.”53 
Nagel observed that “[t]he same scholar who demands specificity in the 
concept of ‘state sovereignty’” before accepting the validity of a decision 
purportedly vindicating it “would ground interpretations of individual rights on 
values such as ‘a meaningful opportunity [for individuals] to realize their 
humanity.’”54  One need not be a federalism zealot to notice this contrast and 
think it, at least upon initial inspection, intellectually problematic.  Though 
Nagel largely devoted his argument to the normative claim that scholars and 
judges should treat federalism as a “fundamental value,” and spent much energy 
subtly mocking the abstract conceptualizing—of which this author generally 
approves—that comprises much of individual rights doctrine, his descriptive 
point is well taken: the Framers did not view freestanding individual rights as 
the primary constraints on government.55  In the minds of the Framers, that role 
was reserved for federalism and the separation of powers.56 
Nagel’s observations about the tendencies of legal scholars are not yet stale, 
a fact that has inspired much more recent calls to treat the Tenth Amendment 
not as a gratuitous “truism,” but as a “truism with an attitude,”57 one that should 
be “read and understood as the full constitutional equivalent of the nine 
                                                 
that while the Framers were probably wrong in thinking structural arrangements sufficient for 
protection of individual liberty, a “modern preoccupation with rights provisions may have 
encouraged us to overlook the possibility that structure remains a necessary condition for liberty. 
Especially in times of terror, rights provisions may become ‘parchment barriers’ to governmental 
oppression. Sometimes it takes a government to check a government”).  Young’s argument is 
particularly plausible given the historical tendency of the courts to stand down in the face of 
executive claims that judicial vigilance might harm national security.  Regarding the other structural 
value—the separation of powers—see Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (describing as a “grave mistake” the attitude that “a Bill of Rights in Madison’s 
scheme then or in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of powers of lesser 
importance”). 
 53. Nagel, Fundamental Value, supra note 52, at 83. 
 54. Id. at 87 (quoting Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1077 (1980)).  Or as one scholar has characterized this 
inconsistency, “[t]o paraphrase John Ely and Bertrand Russell: ‘These are my fundamental 
postulates; those are your abstract, unanchored, wooly generalities; I have the votes and I win.’” 
Soifer, supra note 22, at 804. 
 55. See Nagel, Fundamental Value, supra note 52, at 88. 
 56. See, e.g., Young, Dark Side, supra note 52, at 1284 (noting that the “original [Constitution 
was] built on the assumption that liberty was best secured through a rigorous commitment to 
federalism and separation of powers”).  See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 
(1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’”). 
 57. Gary Lawson, A Truism with an Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional 
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 470 (2008). 
284 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:271 
simultaneously ratified amendments that accompanied it.” 58   According to 
Professor Gary Lawson, “[t]he Tenth Amendment should not apologize for 
invalidating federal laws[,] even though it is ‘but a truism[,]’” because “[o]ther 
constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment, do it all of the time 
without evident embarrassment.”59 
Importantly, the point here is not the normative one that all upstanding 
thinkers should exalt federalism as a “fundamental value” equal in 
“fundamental” status to individual rights; this writer is hardly inspired to do this.  
The point is that modern scholars’ discounting of the Tenth Amendment, and 
federalism more generally, can plausibly be viewed as just as arbitrary and 
ideologically pre-ordained as conservative justices’ emphasis on federalism.  
The latter, then, is a legitimate competitor in the marketplace of analytical 
starting points.  This, in turn, leads into an inquiry of whether the judicial mind 
can responsibly go from the “fundamental value” starting point to infusing 
formal doctrine with creatures such as “state dignity” and the like.  Answering 
this question requires a discussion of why it might be deemed circumstantially 
prudent to do so. 
2.  Federalism Genuflecting or Big Picture Pragmatism? 
The effort so far has been to understand the attitudinal priors of the judicial 
mind inclined to find concepts such as “equal sovereignty” and “state dignity” 
intuitively appealing.  However, just as empathizing with a child who insists on 
believing in Santa Claus hardly makes the actual existence of Santa Claus more 
plausible to the adult mind, so too more work is needed to preclude the dismissal 
of federalism conceptualizing as anti-pragmatic genuflecting, and thus not a 
realistic account of how a judge might respond to the various prudential 
pressures that invariably seep into doctrine. 
It is doubtful that even the most reverent judge views federalism as a 
fundamental value in a manner completely unmoored from the instrumental 
reasons for doing so, notwithstanding assumptions by some that such “state 
dignity” verbiage reflects non-instrumentalist motivations.60  For the penumbral 
approach is very plausibly interpreted to be at once driven by an exaltation of 
federalism as a first principle, as well as the need for compromise between the 
                                                 
 58. Id. at 471. 
 59. Id. at 504. 
 60. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New 
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 25051 (2003) [hereinafter Althouse, Dignity] (“This 
insistence on ‘dignity’ for the states sounds like . . . blind deference to ‘States Rights.’ . . . The 
normative model [that Althouse supports, that is focused on the utility of federalism] would stop to 
ask what the state deserves and why.”); Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State 
Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 777, 807 (2003) (“Alarmingly, the Court has proceeded without so 
much as pausing to determine if its adoption of the dignity rationale [in the Eleventh Amendment 
context] furthers traditional normative values of federalism.”). 
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need to meaningfully sustain federalism in constitutional law while attempting 
to avoid the more dramatic consequences of enforcing a purer form of it. 
Some today hold fast—quaintly or wisely—to Madison’s premise that 
diffused power serves long-term liberty interests; that even though restraining 
federal power works short-term inconveniences, it nurtures the long-term 
subsidiarity that is the hallmark of tame and humble government.61  Federalism 
decisions from the Rehnquist Court are a quote-miner’s treasure-trove regarding 
this utilitarian sentiment.62 
Of course, it is easy to hold fast to such sentiments in the abstract, but when 
enforcing them means invalidating many federal laws and undermining 
expectations that are deeply entrenched in the American legal and political 
landscape—some of which may fall into what has been termed “the Constitution 
outside the Constitution” 63 —pragmatism invariably wins out.  The Court 
understands that the power of prestige on which it thrives is a far less formidable 
power compared to the command of the purse and sword by Congress and the 
executive respectively.64  This reality not only theoretically relegates it to “least 
dangerous”65 branch status, but compels judges to temperamentally internalize 
that status in the form of their fear of over-enforcing law.  In this regard, 
federalism has proven to be an albatross for the Court, and a review of its history 
in jurisprudence makes the current penumbral fruition of the concept utterly 
unsurprising. 
                                                 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (asserting that federalism and the separation 
of powers serve as “a double security” in that “[t]he different governments will control each other; 
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself”). 
 62. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people 
numerous advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the 
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government . . . .”). 
 63. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411 
(2007) [hereinafter Young, Outside]. 
 64. Justice Frankfurter described this reality in his dissent to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
267 (1962).  Believing that the majority’s willingness to adjudicate a state malapportionment 
dispute was imprudent, Justice Frankfurter protested: 
The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests 
on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by 
the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements 
and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political 
settlements. 
Id.  (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that this would be the 
judiciary because of its institutional limitations). 
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That history is familiar to a first-year law student.  In the nineteenth century, 
the Court luxoursly indulged in principled enforcement of dual federalism,66 but 
economic and social changes brought on by the Industrial Revolution forced 
dilution of structural rules.67  By 1937, it became clear that the gig was up on 
dual federalism; faced with either sticking to its principled guns or bending the 
rules to give Congress the regulatory breathing room it needed to jump-start the 
economy, the Court chose the latter option,68 especially in light of President 
Roosevelt’s “court packing” threat. 69   Of course, the poster-child for this 
deference is the Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn 70  where the Court 
reasoned that when a farmer grows wheat on his private land for personal 
consumption his conduct is sufficiently related to “interstate commerce” such 
that Congress may prohibit it in an attempt to stabilize the wheat market.71 
Fast forward to the Rehnquist era and consider: can a judge, determined to 
take federalism seriously on some level, be faulted for seeking some pragmatic 
method of paying federalism principles their due?  If the answer is no, is it so 
implausible that taking a penumbral approach to the Tenth Amendment, and thus 
hanging one’s robe on ethereal concepts such as “state dignity,” might be a good-
faith effort to pragmatically reconcile the nation’s reliance on vast federal power 
with the need to preserve vertical separation-of-powers for at least some of the 
benefits it yields? 
The answer to this question becomes more apparent upon an evaluation of the 
alternative approaches available to the federalism-vigilant judge.  Enforcing dual 
federalism is, of course, always an option, but for obvious reasons there’s no 
going home.  Yes, as the story is often framed in first-year constitutional law 
courses (until recently anyway), the judicial deference discussed above, which 
began during the New Deal era, lasted until the Rehnquist Court ostensibly 
                                                 
 66. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 273 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895).  In all of these cases, 
the Court struck down federal regulations based on conceptualistic determinations that the given 
regulated economic activities were not sufficiently “commercial” or “national” so as to be fair game 
for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause power. 
 67. See Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New 
Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 893 (1984).  Peck writes: 
Major shifts in constitutional doctrine occurred after the industrial revolution 
transformed the United States from an agrarian society to a manufacturing giant.  As a 
result of that transition, the scope of the Commerce Clause was expanded to permit 
regulation of a host of activities never before subject to governmental oversight. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 3031 (1937) (Court 
reversing course in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and thus ushering in the modern era of 
extreme deference toward Congressional power generally). 
 69. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-
Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966). 
 70. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 71. Id. at 12829. 
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sought to reinvigorate dual federalism.72  But although scholars regularly refer 
to the Rehnquist Court years as representing a “federalism revolution,”73 the 
doctrinal legacy of this “revolution” will not be dual federalism.74  The nation is 
long past the point in bureaucratic and social evolution to make the 
consequences of true dual federalism sufficiently tolerable to even conservative 
judges who are, at the end of the day, all pragmatists.75  Thus, due to the obvious 
pressure of pragmatism in Rehnquist-era decisions, the general sentiment 
appears to be that the “federalism revolution” was more a revolution in the 
Court’s attitude toward federalism than a meaningful and consistent doctrinal 
re-invigoration of dual federalism in the Court’s decisions.  For example, writing 
in 1998, Michael C. Dorf wrote that, far from the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
being substantively earth-shaking, the Court appeared to be relatively 
unconcerned with “pursuing decentralization and the other policy goals that 
federalism serves.”76 
In light of contextual realities and the various pressures judges face, a focus 
on conceptualisms that yield from the spirit of federalism is plausibly the 
solution that occurs to the responsible judicial mind seeking to keep federalism 
alive as a formal matter.  Penumbral federalism thus plausibly represents not an 
ideological fetishizing of federalism, but rather a pragmatically watered-down 
version of it.  Of course, such a possibility is not apparent to many who think 
federalism is more an artifact of political history than a legal mandate.  Thus, 
when the Rehnquist Court invoked state dignity in expounding on the Eleventh 
Amendment, and when scholars responded as if the Court was pursuing a purist 
and absolutist vision of state sovereignty,77  scholars such as Professor Ann 
                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800: The Transformation 
of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 166 (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 165. 
 74. Ernie Young has concluded that “although scholars and sometimes dissenting judges 
often worry that the Supreme Court is about to revive dual federalism, it has not in fact done so and 
is extremely unlikely to do so in the future.”  Young, Puzzling, supra note 10, at 2526.  Therefore, 
he believes dual-federalism is “dead.”  Id. at 26. 
 75. See Edward Cantu, Posner’s Pragmatism and the Turn Toward Fidelity, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 69, 71 (2012) (explaining that “most, if not all, ‘formalist’ methodologies are most 
plausibly characterized as forms of pragmatism, thereby rendering as a straw man the formalism 
that pragmatists rail against: a jurisprudence adherent to pre-ordained abstraction or positive law 
without any regard to social consequences”). 
 76. Michael C. Dorf, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1998).  
See also Althouse, Dignity, supra note 60, at 268 (noting that while she “respect[s] the attempt by 
the Court’s conservative majority to try to design safeguards” for states’ rights, she “think[s] that 
it is preferable to take the more drastic step of overruling [Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)]” to demonstrate that “traditional state functions” are off limits to 
otherwise legitimate exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority). 
 77. On this note, contrast Michael Dorf’s comment, above, that the Rehnquist Court was not 
interested in meaningfully restoring dual federalism, id., with Joseph Fishkin’s charge, discussed 
further below, that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism jurisprudence represented a vision of 
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Althouse placed the Court’s decisions in the greater context of what pro-
federalism voices wanted the Court to do, and asserted that “[o]pponents of 
sovereign immunity law ought to consider the possibility that [the relevant 
decisions] represent[] a moderate compromise, an alternative to” a more purist 
and consequential approach.78 
The need to eschew doctrinaire approaches to structural questions is rather 
apparent, but it does not necessarily follow that the pragmatic judicial mind 
would necessary gravitate toward penumbral federalism, specifically, as the 
approach to meaningfully keep federalism alive while striking a pragmatic 
balance.  So what use is the penumbral approach aside from serving as a source 
for satisfying exaltation rhetoric? 
When the Court began emphasizing state dignity as the basis for state 
sovereign immunity (discussed further below), Professor Evan Caminker was 
one of the first scholars to recognize the possibility that such conceptualizing 
was more than “window dressing,” but rather an “alternative approach to 
constitutional interpretation.”79  Caminker argued that a focus on states’ dignity 
and reputational interests represents a concern for “expressive harms” caused to 
states by federal laws that “denigrate” or disrespect the states as separate 
sovereigns deserving of citizen’s loyalty and respect.80 
Caminker emphasized that it is “surely silly” to characterize the Court’s 
emphasis on state dignity as reflective of viewing the states as actually suffering 
some “psychic injury,” as if they are individuals with real emotions.81  “A far 
more plausible characterization,” Caminker argued, is that the majorities in the 
relevant cases believed “that disrespectful treatment of states should not be 
tolerated because it contravenes the proper understanding of our governmental 
regime[,]” and that “constitutional rules governing issues of federalism should 
conform with and reflect the nation’s political identity.”82  Adam Cox framed 
the Court’s anti-commandeering decisions, discussed further below, in similar 
terms, arguing that a defense of state dignity might be the Court’s attempt to 
keep the marketplace for citizen loyalty a reasonably competitive one,” 83  a 
posture which, if truly that of conservative justices, represents their learning to 
                                                 
federalism “locked into an antiquated view of the Reconstruction-era long abandoned by scholars,” 
Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, YALE L.J. ONLINE, 175, 188 (quoting Eric Foner, The 
Deciding Vote,  NATION, Mar. 29, 2004, http://www.thenation.com/article/deciding-vote). 
 78. See Althouse, Dignity, supra note 60, at 267. 
 79. Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS 81, 82 (2001). 
 80. Id. at 8283. 
 81. Id. at 85. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-
Commandeering Rule?, 33 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1324 (2000). 
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live with the “procedural safeguards”84 of politics as the primary guardian of 
states’ rights rather than vigilant and assertive jurisprudence. 
The point here is not to “defend” a penumbral view of the Tenth 
Amendment,85 but rather to highlight why such a view might take hold in the 
judicial mind eager to keep federalism alive while also pragmatically accepting 
that the ratchet of federal power can indeed turn in only one direction, at least if 
significant disruption to the nation is to be avoided.  Having an understanding 
of penumbral federalism conceptually, as well as an appreciation of why some 
on the Court would indulge this predisposition in approaching federalism issues, 
we are better positioned to view decisions in recent decades, combined with 
decisions from the 2012 term, as part of the same trajectory toward penumbral 
federalism as an increasingly dominant driver of federalism jurisprudence. The 
discussion thus must now turn to a descriptive account of how penumbral 
federalism has informed the Court’s jurisprudence. 
II.  PENUMBRAL FEDERALISM’S TRAJECTORY BROUGHT INTO RELIEF 
The Court’s express or implied invocation of state dignity is nothing new, and 
neither is scholars’ focus on the implications of it. On a more general level, 
scholars began in the late Rehnquist Court years to reflect on how, despite the 
stir the Court was creating with its federalism decisions, those decisions were 
largely symbolic and have had little doctrinal staying power.  For example, Lynn 
Baker and Ernest Young wrote in 2001 that the Rehnquist Court’s “most 
prominent federalism cases . . . have involved fairly minor federal regulatory 
                                                 
 84. This is a reference to the Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985), which the Rehnquist Court never overruled, wherein the Court 
noted that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal 
power.”  This decision is often thought to represent the Court’s “giving up” on enforcing federalism 
altogether until the Rehnquist Court began its “federalism revolution.” 
 85. Though it does have some pedigree in the writings of the Founders.  For example, in The 
Federalist No. 17, Alexander Hamilton framed federalism as a vertical competition for the 
“affections” and “good will” of the people.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).  
Hamilton explained: 
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his 
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each 
State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards 
the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a 
much better administration of the latter. . . . The separate governments in a confederacy 
may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that 
from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-
will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all 
encroachments of the national government. 
Id. 
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efforts with mostly symbolic impact.”86  Professor Neil Siegel has similarly 
described some Rehnquist Court decisions as manifestations of “symbolic 
federalism,”87 a phrase Orin Kerr shares: “the theme of the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence is [s]ymbolic [f]ederalism.  If there is a federalism 
issue that doesn’t have a lot of practical importance, there’s a decent chance five 
votes exist for the pro-federalism side.”88 
However, most scholars recognizing that federalism-vigilance has mostly 
been “symbolic” in nature have not further unpacked the specific manifestation 
of that symbolism—namely, protection of state dignity—and situated it within 
a larger narrative of a wholesale doctrinal shift.  Those scholars who have 
focused on the increasing invocation of state dignity have mostly confined 
recognition of it to those discrete contexts in which such invocation has been 
quite express, rather than examining how it is also latent in other evolving areas 
of federalism jurisprudence.89   This is understandable, given that only very 
recently have the Court’s opinions provided indications that the penumbral 
conceptualizing in the relevant discrete contexts might be seeping into others.  
This section will introduce the Court’s employment of state dignity in recent 
federalism decisions, and will ultimately highlight how decisions from the 2012 
term—Shelby County and Windsor—are characterized as a part of this trend.90 
                                                 
 86. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 159 (2001). 
 87. Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. 
L. REV. 1629, 1665 (2006).  Cf. Anthony Johnstone, Commandeering Information (and Informing 
the Commandeered), 161 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 217 (2013) (“[J]udicial safeguards of federalism 
typically have more bite in narrow, symbolic cases . . . than in larger cases that threaten to 
undermine long-settled national policies . . . .”). 
 88. Orin Kerr, The Rehnquist Court and Symbolic Federalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 6, 2005, 
1:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/06/the-rehnquist-court-and-symbolic-federalism/.  
Kerr noted that the Court’s decision in Lopez 
resulted in very little change in substantive law.  Yes, the decision struck down a federal 
statute, but it indicated that Congress could quickly reenact the statute with a very slight 
change.  Congress did exactly that: It re-passed the statute with the added interstate 
commerce element shortly after the Lopez decision.  Lower courts have upheld the 
amended statute, and the Supreme Court has shown no interest in reviewing their rulings. 
Because nearly every gun has traveled in or affected interstate commerce, the federal law 
of possessing guns in school zones is essentially the same today as it was pre-Lopez. 
Id.  See also Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (2004) [hereinafter Althouse, Times of Terror] (“Although the 
Rehnquist Court has acquired a reputation for enforcing federalism, in reality its efforts have not 
been very robust.  So far, the Court has crafted its doctrine to show some deference to state and 
local government, but it has not threatened federal power where it is seriously needed.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 60, at 831. 
 90. See infra Part II.A. 
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A.  Pre-2012 Specimens 
Decisions from the 2012 term, discussed below, invite not only the inference 
that the Court is more open to animating federalism through penumbral concepts 
such as state dignity, they also invite a retrospective evaluation of how pre-2012 
decisions by the Court can be framed as constituting a conceptual ramping-up to 
decisions such as Windsor and Shelby County.  It helps to examine the early 
budding of penumbral federalism in Rehnquist Court decisions before delving 
into more recent manifestations. 
1.  State Sovereign Immunity 
The doctrinal context in which state dignity has the most pedigree in precedent 
is the Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity context.91  As Professor 
Scott Dodson has explained, the Court has relied on state dignity, in this context, 
since the nineteenth century92 in decisions such as In re Ayers.93  After going 
dormant for some time, state dignity reemerged in Rehnquist Court decisions 
such as Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,94 
where the Court explained that “[t]he very object and purpose of the [Eleventh] 
Amendment [is] to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive 
process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private parties.”95 
In state sovereign immunity decisions following Metcalf & Eddy, the Court 
increasingly began making state dignity the central focus of its Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence in the early twenty-first century.  In Hess v. Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 96  the Court noted that “current Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our 
federal system[,]”97 and therefore “sovereign immunity . . . accords the States 
the respect owed them as members of the federation.”98  By 2002, it was clear 
that protection of state dignity was, according to the Court, the primary purpose 
of the Eleventh Amendment: “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign 
immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities.”99   The Court in Federal Maritime explained it was not 
“becoming” of sovereign entities to be required to answer the complaints of 
private persons in court. 100 
                                                 
 91. See Dodson, supra note 60, at 806. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 123 U.S. 443 (1887). 
 94. 506 U.S. 139 (1993). 
 95. Id. at 146. 
 96. 513 U.S. 30 (1994). 
 97. Id. at 39.  See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) 
(noting the “the dignity and respect afforded a State, which . . . immunity is designed to protect”). 
 98. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146. 
 99. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). 
 100. Id. 
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Responding to this evident trend in sovereign immunity decisions, in 2000 
Ann Althouse lamented what she termed the “new federalism” represented by 
abstract and non-functionalist concepts such as state dignity.101  According to 
Althouse, beginning with the era of Chief Justice Berger, the Court “began what 
has become a continuing search for ways to enforce federalism” following the 
Warren Court’s disinclination to do so.” 102   It began with the relatively 
normative and functionalist framing of federalism in decisions such as Younger 
v. Harris,103  of which Althouse approves, and devolved into the increasing 
invocation of “abstract concepts of the state and its attendant dignities or the 
abstraction of sovereignty.”104 
Penumbral dignity language in the Eleventh Amendment context has only 
grown more bald and unequivocal in the Roberts Court, which is no surprise 
given the momentum created by the Rehnquist Court, the succession of Chief 
Justice Roberts, and the continuing influence of Justice Kennedy.105  A concern 
for state dignity clearly drove both the majority opinion and Justice Roberts’ 
dissent (which Justice Alito joined) in the recent decision in Virginia Office for 
Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart.106  That offensiveness toward state dignity 
was constitutionally dispositive was uncontroversial; the majority and dissent 
merely disagreed about how offended state dignity must be before the 
constitutional line is crossed.107 
At issue in Stewart was the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act of 2000,108 which offered states federal funds for the improvement 
of services for citizens with certain disabilities.109  The Act required states to 
establish an independent entity, either private or as part of the state government, 
                                                 
 101. Althouse, Dignity, supra note 60, at 262. 
 102. Id. at 246. 
 103. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (establishing that federal courts should abstain from hearing 
constitutional claims when the remedy is to enjoin state court criminal proceedings).  In discussing 
the federalism implications of the case, Justice Black, presenting the value of federalism in 
utilitarian terms, asserted that “the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”  Id. at 44. 
 104. Althouse, Dignity, supra note 60, at 249.  Althouse further discussed how this dignity 
rhetoric has spread to doctrine regarding Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.  
See id. at 250.  See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[States] are not relegated to 
the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full 
authority, of sovereignty.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (noting the 
“indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties”) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 
146 (1993) (internal quotaion marks omitted). 
 105. Althouse, Dignity, supra note 60, at 25052 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
of sovereign immunity and Justice Kennedy’s reasoning about federalism). 
 106. 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011). 
 107. Id. at 164041. 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. § 15001 (2012). 
 109. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. at 163536. 
2015] The Roberts Court and Penumbral Federalism 293 
to advocate for the rights of persons with developmental disabilities.110  Virginia 
chose to establish its advocacy office as a state office, the Virginia Office for 
Protection and Advocacy (VOPA), but with the requisite independence to sue 
the state should doing so be necessary to combat relevant rights violations.111  
VOPA did just that when the state refused to release the records of patients 
injured in state-run mental health hospitals.112 
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the suit was a violation of the Eleventh 
Amendment because the dispute was an undignified “intramural contest,” that 
is, one between two state offices.113  Because of this, federal court adjudication 
would implicate the “dignity and sovereignty of the states” to a degree sovereign 
immunity does not allow.114  This, in turn, precluded the availability of the Ex 
Parte Young 115  doctrine, which allows plaintiffs to circumvent sovereign 
immunity by naming not the states as defendants but rather state officers in their 
individual capacities.116 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Ex Parte Young doctrine 
was available.117  According to the majority, the doctrine’s availability did not 
turn on whether the plaintiff was a private party as opposed to another state 
entity.118  Notwithstanding the outcome, the majority implicitly agreed with the 
notion that dispositive was the degree to which the nature of the suit offended 
state “stature” and imposed an “indignity” on the states,119 not the diminution of 
state coffers or the degree to which suits might practically interfere with states’ 
ability to manage their affairs free from federal interference.120 
Justices Roberts and Alito, in dissent, characterized states’ dignity as being 
much more fragile than did Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who joined the 
majority. 121   Justice Roberts made little effort in explaining how precisely 
federal court entertainment of “intramural” suits manifestly undermines state 
                                                 
 110. Id. at 1636. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1637. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 116. See id. at 16768. 
 117. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. at 1642. 
 118. Id. at 1639. 
 119. Id. at 1640.  The court wrote that, 
[t]he . . . indignity against which sovereign immunity protects is the insult to a State of 
being haled into court without its consent. . . . We fail to perceive what Eleventh 
Amendment indignity is visited on the Commonwealth when, by operation of its own 
laws, VOPA is admitted to federal court as a plaintiff. 
Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 164849 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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“sovereignty” is some less-than-transcendental sense.” 122   Rather, Roberts 
employed phraseology suggesting that the offensiveness of the suit to Virginia’s 
sovereignty was intuitively obvious: “private entities are different from public 
ones: They are private. When private litigants are involved, the State is not 
turned against itself.” 123   Immediately following were Roberts’ attempts to 
highlight the “real difference” between state-state suits and private-state suits 
with analogies to the distinction between 
eating and cannibalism; between murder and patricide. While the 
ultimate results may be the same—a full stomach and a dead body—
it is the means of getting there that attracts notice. I would think it 
more an affront to someone’s dignity to be sued by a brother than to 
be sued by a stranger.124 
Important here is not the outcome of the case, or even the fact that notions of 
state dignity at times drive application of federalism principles in the Roberts 
Court, but rather how relatively willing Justices Roberts and Alito were to so 
stridently allege the doctrinal centrality and importance of state dignity relative 
to Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who were themselves federalism-vigilant 
justices during the Rehnquist Court years and remain so.  Notably, the former 
pair are much younger justices than the latter,125 a fact suggesting that scholars 
must get accustomed to notions of state dignity animating Court doctrine.  They 
should get less accustomed to assuming that merely because notions such as state 
dignity and equal sovereignty have little pedigree in precedent, they will not be 
serious points of discussion in first-year constitutional law classes in the coming 
decades. 
2.  Anti-Commandeering 
State dignity is not as obvious of a go-to descriptive rubric in the anti-
commandeering context as it is with state sovereign immunity; anti-
commandeering jurisprudence is located one or two notches down on the 
obviousness continuum.  But the penumbral framing still fits without much 
finagling.  While an extended discussion of anti-commandeering cases is not 
warranted here, a brief mention of them, and scholarly reactions, helps to flesh 
out the gradual fruition of doctrinal penumbral federalism in this context. 
In Printz, the Court declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds 
Congress’ attempt via the Brady Handgun Violence Act to force state officials 
to perform background checks on citizens seeking to purchase firearms.126  The 
                                                 
 122. Id. at 1648, 1651. 
 123. Id. at 1649. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (Feb. 27, 2015). 
 126. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 93435 (1997). 
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very language the Court used to characterize what such federal laws “do” to 
states suggests an attitude of instinctive protectiveness of state dignity and 
“sovereignty” as an abstract matter.  The Court described such federal laws as 
“commandeering”—that is, taking control by force 127 —state governments 
and/or officials, and “impress[ion of] state [officials] into . . . service”128 for 
federal purposes.  Conspicuous was the relative de-emphasis of the material 
burdens such federal laws place on states, such as diverting state resources to 
comply with federal law, though certainly such burdens were mentioned.129  
Rather, the Court, focusing on “essential postulates” 130  of the Constitution, 
employed language suggesting a focus not on the burdens imposed but rather on 
the disrespect of the States that the Brady Act expressed: Congress was guilty of 
“reducing them to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”131 
The Court also explained the constitutional problem in terms of political 
accountability, a line of reasoning pregnant with concerns for the reputational 
interests of the states, and thus their ability to remain meaningful competitors 
for voters’ respect: 
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of 
implementing a federal regulatory program, members of Congress can 
take credit for “solving” problems without having to ask their 
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And 
even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of 
implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of 
taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.132 
The Court employed the same reasoning in New York v. United States,133 the 
other major anti-commandeering decision from the Rehnquist Court.  There, the 
State of New York challenged a federal law that, among other things, imposed 
on states the obligation to take-title to radioactive waste generated by private 
generators within their borders, or alternatively to assume the financial liability 
of those generators should the state fail to take title.134  The Court characterized 
this as Congress circumventing direct regulation of private entities by 
commandeering state governments and, in turn, requiring them to regulate in 
                                                 
 127. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 248 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
“commandeer” as “to take arbitrary or forcible possession of”). 
 128. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 129. See id. at 90810. 
 130. Id. at 918. 
 131. Id. at 928. 
 132. Id. at 930. 
 133. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 134. See id. at 15354 (discussing “the take title provision” of the relevant federal act). 
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furtherance of Congressional goals.135 -The Court emphasized the accountability 
—and thus reputational—problem with such arrangements.136  Specifically, it 
emphasized that when Congress invokes its powers under the Supremacy Clause 
and directly regulates private parties—which it could likely do in this context 
given its power to regulate interstate commerce—it suffers the brunt of future 
public dissatisfaction with such laws.137  But, “where the Federal Government 
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory 
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their 
decision.”138 
Cox was one of few scholars who framed these anti-commandeering decisions 
as turning on “expressive” concerns; he proposed that “the anti-commandeering 
rule might serve the important function of representing and reinforcing social 
understandings of state ‘autonomy’ that are crucial to the production of some of 
the public goods secured by federalism.”139  Cox elaborated: 
The maintenance of vibrant states that can act as political 
counterweights to the federal government thus plausibly depends on 
public perceptions of state autonomy. . . . My tentative claim is that it 
does so by invalidating certain government action that threatens 
seriously to undermine these public perceptions.  In invalidating such 
actions, the Court does two related things: it prevents congressional 
legislation from expressing a particular message that might erode the 
social understanding of state autonomy, and it simultaneously 
reinforces that social understanding by expressing due regard for the 
importance of state autonomy.140 
Cox’s qualifier of tentativeness made perfect sense at the time, as the Court was 
far from clear in the above decisions that central to its reasoning was a conscious 
concern for the expressive aspects of the federal laws in question.  But at times 
during a doctrine’s development, or in the Court’s attitudinal unfolding, legal 
scholarship must generally focus on what the Court might be doing rather than 
what it is saying, as focusing on the latter perhaps insults the intelligence of the 
justices who should charitably not be deemed to always take their own rhetoric 
at face value. 
                                                 
 135. See id. at 17576.  For example, the Court reasoned that, by requiring states to take title 
to privately generated waste, Congress effectively required the states to pass laws subsidizing 
private generators.  Id. 
 136. See id. at 16869. 
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 139. Cox, supra note 83, at 1316. 
 140. Id. at 1329. 
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3.  Additional Miscellaneous Roberts Court Specimens 
This inclination to abandon tentativeness is further stoked by miscellaneous 
decisions by the Roberts Court that reveal penumbral federalism’s increasing 
tendency to wander the docket like some conceptual strongman ready to pounce 
where deference to states’ special status is most needed to tilt the outcome of a 
case.  The following discussion focuses on a few examples that reveal how 
penumbral federalism is currently reaching beyond the doctrinal contexts to 
which it was previously confined by the Rehnquist Court. 
a.  Standing Doctrine: Massachusetts v. EPA 
A good example is the Court’s 2007 standing decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,141 where Massachusetts sued claiming that the EPA was abdicating its 
statutory duties to regulate greenhouse gases. 142   The EPA argued that 
Massachusetts did not have standing, as its interest in EPA regulation of 
greenhouse gases was not greater than the interest generalized to every other 
state, or, for that matter, every individual citizen interested in living in a 
reasonably clean environment.143 -Nevertheless, the Court found Massachusetts 
had standing due to the “special solicitude” states are entitled to in standing 
analysis given their “quasi-sovereign interests.”144 
The majority’s reasoning was predictably rebuked by Chief Justice Roberts in 
his dissent: “Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries 
are pressed by a State . . . has no basis in our jurisprudence, and support for any 
such ‘special solicitude’ is conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion.”145  
Roberts went on to discuss how the single case the Court relied upon as 
precedential support for the “special solicitude” states purportedly receive had 
nothing to do with standing.146  To Roberts, the decision was driven by no more 
than the notion that, even under Article III standing analysis—an analysis the 
Court theoretically does not have the authority to alter for prudential purposes—
states are “special,” and courts should treat them as such for reasons detached 
from traditional federalism constraints.147 
                                                 
 141. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 142. Id. at 505. 
 143. Id. at 50506. 
 144. Id. at 520. 
 145. Id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 537.  Roberts explained: 
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Id.  
 147. Id. at 520 (majority opinion). 
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b.  Personal Jurisdiction: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. NiCastro 
Another miscellaneous example of this penumbral federalism popping up to 
fill analytical gaps is the Court’s 2011 personal jurisdiction decision in J. 
McIntyre Machinery v. NiCastro.148  Great detail is not needed here; the issue 
was simply whether a federal Court in New Jersey could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant under the Court’s “specific 
jurisdiction” analysis.  It has long been obvious—and is usually recognized as 
obvious—that specific jurisdiction analysis is a corollary of due process; it 
simply is not fair for a court to adjudicate the rights and duties of a defendant 
who has no meaningful contact with the forum state.149 
Throughout the doctrine’s evolution, the Court has suggested that federalism 
concerns have also driven the Court’s insistence on “minimum contacts” 
between defendants and forum states.150  But the Court has never made clear—
and scholars have never quite figured out—how specific jurisdiction 
meaningfully implicates federalism.  This elephant in the room inspired the 
Court, in a prior decision, to eventually disclaim a federalism basis for personal 
jurisdiction: 
The restriction on state sovereign power [in the personal jurisdiction 
context] . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual 
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.  That Clause is 
the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause 
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.  Furthermore, if the 
federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the 
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the 
personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change 
the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself 
to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.151 
Despite this attempt to shake the tenacious federalism verbiage in personal 
jurisdiction analysis, it reappeared again in NiCastro, wherein Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, declared that the limitations imposed by specific 
                                                 
 148. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 149. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“A court may subject a 
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jurisdiction analysis protects the “federal balance, which posits that each State 
has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”152 
Just as before, the Court did not elucidate how exactly ensuring “minimum 
contacts” between defendants and fora advances federalism.  Rather, it left 
readers to conclude that the Court uses federalism in this context as a moral place 
holder of sorts, one inspired by an intuitive uneasiness, rooted in horizontal 
federalism, about adjudication absent minimum contacts.  Such “disrespectful” 
behavior by one state toward another is thus similar to the problem that arises 
when one mows a neighbor’s lawn without permission: in theory it ought to be 
appreciated, but in practice there is something offensive about it.  The problem 
with this is, of course, that states are not normally heard complaining about the 
lessening of their judicial workloads due to neighboring states exercising 
personal jurisdiction over defendants absent “minimum contacts.” 
c.  Spending Clause Doctrine: National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius 
The Roberts Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius,153 in which the Court struck down a provision of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) (but, as mentioned above, upheld the more controversial “individual 
mandate”), is likely the most discussed and controversial specimen of Roberts 
Court federalism.154  What scholars have generally failed to recognize, however, 
is that the Court struck that provision by way of a Spending Power analysis that 
appears to have been driven by a concern for the electoral competiveness of 
states—simply put, by a concern that the federal government was making the 
states look bad. 
One aspect of the ACA at issue in Sebelius was the so-called “Medicaid 
expansion.”155  The law required states to expand Medicaid services to many 
people who would not qualify under the old Medicaid program.156  For example, 
while states traditionally offered Medicaid benefits to those with incomes of 
about 50% of the federal poverty level, the ACA required states to cover all 
persons under sixty-five who earned well over the poverty level: specifically, 
133% of the poverty level.157  Under the ACA, the federal government would 
not completely fund this expansion, leaving it to the states to partially fund it.158  
The crux for the states was, if they refused to fund the expansion, the ACA 
allowed the Department of Health and Human Services to withdraw all Medicaid 
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funding the states had been regularly receiving from the federal government 
under the old program.159 
The expansion was challenged as beyond Congress’ power under the 
Spending Clause of Article I.160  Specifically, the petitioners argued that, per the 
Court’s jurisprudence, the threat of complete Medicaid defunding was so 
financially threatening to the states such that the expansion provision amounted 
to unconstitutional coercion of state governments. 161   The Court agreed, 
emphasizing that the states had acted in reliance on prior funding by Congress, 
developing “intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of 
many decades.”162  Thus, the Court asserted that “the financial ‘inducement’ 
Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is 
a gun to the head” of the states.163 
Importantly for present purposes, Chief Justice Roberts, before addressing the 
above mentioned practical burdens faced by the states under the Medicaid 
expansion, took care to explain why such coercion was constitutionally 
significant beyond satisfying the abstract coerciveness test itself.164  Roberts 
emphasized the problems of political accountability that coercion created: 
“Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal 
program would threaten the political accountability key to our federal 
system.”165  Roberts explained that, under coercive spending conditions, “it may 
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the 
electoral ramifications of their decision.”166  Roberts continued: 
Spending Clause programs do not pose this danger when a State has a 
legitimate choice whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange 
for federal funds.  In such a situation, state officials can fairly be held 
politically accountable for choosing to accept or refuse the federal 
offer.  But when the State has no choice, the Federal Government can 
achieve its objectives without accountability . . . .167 
Roberts then expressly invoked the accountability reasoning in New York and 
Printz, as explicated in the Dormant Commerce Clause context, as just as 
applicable in this context. 
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The Court’s most recent Spending Clause decision, then, reveals the Roberts 
Court’s willingness to inject into this area of doctrine a concern for state status: 
specifically, for its democratic viability in competing for citizen loyalty and 
approval.  The Court thus made operative for purposes of federalism analysis a 
problem wholly distinct from considerations of material state sovereignty or 
regulatory autonomy. 
The implicit penumbral federalism stubbornly present in civil procedure 
decisions, as well as all of the other specimens discussed above, lead into the 
2012 term and beg the question: in light of recent history, to what extent do 
Roberts Court decisions of that term further suggest a wholesale, even if gradual, 
transition in the Court’s federalism doctrine toward Tenth Amendment 
penumbral conceptualizing?  Tentativeness is still wise, though perhaps less 
necessary than during the Rehnquist era; a discussion of Windsor and Shelby 
County illustrates why. 
B.  The 2012 Term: Windsor and Shelby County 
The 2012 term provides evidence that, aside from a willingness to emphasize 
dignity in the sovereign immunity context with an unprecedented degree of 
straight-faced conviction, the penumbral approach to animating the Tenth 
Amendment’s requirements is spreading to other doctrinal contexts.  The best 
examples of this are the Court’s decisions in Windsor and Shelby County. 
1.  Windsor v. United States 
Windsor involved the constitutionality of section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA), which provided that same-sex married couples—that is, legally 
married couples under the laws of their respective states—could not qualify for, 
among other things, various federal tax benefits available to opposite-sex 
married couples. 168   Many suspected the Court would declare the DOMA 
provision invalid on traditional federalism grounds because the provision 
allegedly “usurped” the states’ traditional role of regulating marriage within 
their borders.169  As this reasoning goes, by rejecting the state definition of 
marriage for federal law purposes, Congress interfered with New York’s 
sovereign authority to define marriage as it sees fit. 170   This is the more 
traditional freestanding form of the federalism argument: states have the right to 
regulate within their borders certain matters of traditionally local concern, and 
Congress cannot stop them from doing so.171  Alternatively—and, frankly, as the 
                                                 
 168. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
 169. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-
marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
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much stronger argument—the Court could have declared the provision a 
violation of equal protection principles as traditionally explicated, due to the 
discriminatory provision having no basis other than animus toward a politically 
unpopular group, thereby failing rational basis review under established equal 
protection reasoning.172 
The Court took neither approach.  Rather, its reasoning is best characterized 
as focused on the offensiveness of the federal law to state sovereignty as a highly 
abstract matter.  To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to discuss 
both how the Court explained itself and the facial problems with that 
explanation. 
Justice Kennedy, in ramping up the majority’s analysis, preliminarily noted 
that it was “unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power 
is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance[,]” and 
immediately declared that the “[s]tate’s power in defining the marital relation is 
of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.”173  
These lines, which the Court provided in quick succession, speak volumes in 
their failure to facially communicate anything coherent. 
The glaring problem is that the Court characterized DOMA as a “federal 
intrusion on state power,” but in the same sentence declared it was not deciding 
whether such intrusion “disrupts the federal balance.”174  Of course, federal 
intrusion on state power is the very definition of “disrupting the federal balance.”  
And disruption of the federal balance is the very thing “principles of federalism” 
classically prohibits.  Facially, these assertions in Windsor are so collectively 
schizophrenic that no judge worth their salt could write them in quick succession 
without understanding, and likely leveraging, their contradictory nature. 
To make matters worse, the majority asserted that “principles of federalism” 
were not relevant (“quite apart from”), but yet declared that the “[s]tate’s power 
in defining the marital relations [was] of central relevance” to the case.  If the 
Court believed that “principles of federalism” were not significant to the case, 
but nevertheless thought the “state’s power,” and New York’s decision to 
exercise that power, were “central” to the case—clearly a federalism concern—
then what kind of federalism is at work here? 
In explaining why the states’ “power in defining the marital relation” was 
central, the Court quickly merged into individual rights language: New York 
used its “historic and essential authority” to confer on same-sex couples “a 
dignity and status of immense import.”175  The opinion continued with this 
evasive conceptual oscillation between federalism and equal protection: 
The arguments put forward by [DOMA’s defenders] are . . . candid 
about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state 
                                                 
 172. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 63132 (1996). 
 173. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id.  
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sovereign choices about who may be married. As the title and 
dynamics of the bill indicate, its purpose is to discourage enactment of 
state same-sex marriage laws and to restrict the freedom and choice of 
couples married under those laws if they are enacted. The 
congressional goal was “to put a thumb on the scales and influence a 
state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws.” . . . DOMA 
is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person 
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.176 
Language such as this makes rather clear that at some level Windsor was about 
federalism, but the degree to which this is true is unclear, especially in light of 
the Court’s ultimate claim that DOMA was invalid under equal protection 
principles via the Fifth Amendment.  To conclude that “principles of federalism” 
were irrelevant, one must ignore the Court’s repeated, methodical, and crutching 
injection of state sovereignty language into what otherwise would resemble a 
traditional equal protection analysis.  Hence Justice Roberts’ dissenting assertion 
that “it is undeniable that [the Court’s] judgment is based on federalism.”177  
Even scholars relatively inclined to accept judicial reasoning as explicated on its 
face have recognized this.178 
Besides the opinion’s actual language, it is highly likely that the signatory 
justices had federalism concerns front and center in their minds given what is 
known about those justices’ philosophies.179  For this reason, scholars such as 
Ernest Young threw their weight behind federalism attacks on DOMA long 
before the Court handed down its decision,180 and scholars generally assumed 
that not only would Kennedy author the Windsor opinion, but also that the 
resulting opinion would invalidate the relevant DOMA provisions on 
freestanding federalism grounds. 181   Importantly, however, there is a big 
problem with the freestanding federalism approach, a problem that likely 
explains why the Court did not take this route. 
                                                 
 176. Id. at 2693, 2695. 
 177. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 178. See, e.g., Young, Defining Rights, supra note 5, at 46 (“Congress’s usurpation of the 
states’ role was a pervasive factor throughout the Court’s equal protection analysis.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, Justice Kennedy’s Former Clerk Explains Why He Thinks His Old 
Boss Killed the Defense of Marriage Act, BUS. INSIDER (June 28, 2013, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-did-kennedy-strike-down-doma-2013-6. 
 180. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor at 
34, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (arguing that regulation of 
marriage is “reserved to the states,” and that section 3 of DOMA unconstitutionally “lacks a limiting 
principle to cabin its usurpation of state control over domestic relations”). 
 181. See, e.g., Richard Socarides, The Biggest Stakes in the Supreme Court Marriage Cases, 
THE NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-biggest-
stakes-in-the-supreme-court-marriage-cases. 
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Fundamentally, federalism amounts to the same type of “negative liberty”182 
for states that individuals enjoy under individual rights provisions: it protects 
states’ ability to do things—namely regulate within their borders—without the 
federal government stopping them.183  The analytical elephant in the room is that 
DOMA did not prevent New York from recognizing same-sex marriage and 
making such marriages legally valid generally.184  What it did do is declare that 
such state policy would not control how federal law would be applied in New 
York.  Thus, far from precluding the legalization of same-sex marriage in the 
states, DOMA declared that such state sovereign decisions would not govern in 
discrete federal-law contexts.185  Indeed, one could go so far as to argue—
plausibly but not necessarily persuasively—that Section 3 of DOMA protected 
federal regulatory autonomy from excessive state interference.  Those who 
advanced freestanding federalism arguments faced the task of demonstrating 
that state sovereignty included the ability not only to legalize same-sex marriage, 
and define marriage for purposes of state law, but also to dictate how federal tax 
law would be applied within their borders.  This argument is too ambitious; but 
the stench of federal arrogance was strong, as that stench was what inspired 
good-faith federalism arguments in the first place.  So how should the judge 
sensitive to this arrogance and its implications frame and tackle the problem? 
The best conclusion is that the majority (especially Justice Kennedy) believed 
DOMA “offended” state autonomy by disregarding state laws in regulatory 
contexts wherein states have been traditionally thought to reign supreme.186  
Federalism in Windsor took the form of indignance that the federal government 
would disregard the moral determinations made by state legislatures of the 
propriety of certain marital arrangements.187  The symbolic flouting of state 
policy determinations about matters of traditionally local concern represented 
nothing more than federal disrespect (rather than a material usurpation) of the 
states’ traditional relationship with its own citizens.  Such can hardly be deemed 
                                                 
 182. Used here to mean its usual meaning: freedom from government action.  See, e.g., 
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2005) 
(defining it as the “freedom to pursue [one’s] own interests and desires free of improper government 
interference”). 
 183. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (“The essence of federalism is 
that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a 
common, uniform mold.”); Fishkin, supra note 77 (“[S]tates are sovereign in that they possess the 
power to make law.”).  Of course, the flip side of this definitional coin is that federalism protects 
individuals from federal laws that dabble in the state regulatory province, even absent some state 
law with which the federal law “interferes.”  But this still presupposes that the federal law does 
indeed regulate in a manner in which only state law is constitutionally permitted. 
 184. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Barnett, supra note 169. 
 187. See Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United 
States v. Windsor, 20122013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 13940 (2012). 
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a “federalism” problem unless the operative conception of federalism is that it 
serves not only as a check on substantive federal regulatory overreach, but also 
as a mechanism of maintaining a healthy dynamic of federal humility and state 
prestige. 
Scholarly responses that have tried to nudge the opinion toward a close 
increment of doctrinal or theoretical coherence have proven unsatisfactory.  This 
is largely because they resort to, or rely on, more traditional doctrinal rubrics, 
predominantly the problematic freestanding federalism premise discussed 
above.  As such, no explanation of the Windsor opinion is as satisfactory as the 
penumbral framing: that the decision was driven by the offensiveness of DOMA 
to state dignity. 
Ernest Young, for example, has been at the forefront of noted scholars offering 
rational reconstructions of the Windsor opinion.  He and Erin Blondel have 
argued that, contrary to the reactions of some who described the opinion as 
making little sense, it was actually a “brilliant” illustration of how “federalism 
and equality doctrine intersect,” 188  and how the debate over which set of 
principles “truly” drove the opinion—federalism or equal protection—misses 
the fundamental ways these two broad constitutional principles are pervasively 
intertwined.”189  The ultimate point Young and Blondel set out to establish is not 
the relatively unambitious notion that the federalism and equal protection 
analyses in the opinion independently work to buttress the correctness of the 
Court’s judgment, but rather that the conceptual intermingling of the two is 
perfectly consistent with traditional doctrinal understandings.190  Their argument 
seems to strain to fit the Court’s opinion into established doctrinal and 
theoretical molds, and does not allow for the judicial perversion of those molds 
that descriptive legal realism requires.  Hence, in this posture Young, in separate 
work, overreaches in declaring that the opinion was not “muddled or vague” as 
scholars almost unanimously claim; on the contrary, “the rationale is actually 
quite evident on the face of [the] opinion.”191 
Young and Blondel begin with the noncontroversial propositions that the 
“Constitution’s structural features” are designed to ultimately “secure the liberty 
of the people[,]” and that, sometimes, “rights and structure intersect at the 
doctrinal level as well.”192  The problem is, the argument never persuasively 
illustrates how these propositions prove the point specifically with regard to the 
Windsor opinion; that is, how these general truths work to reconcile the Court’s 
invocation of federalism principles in its equal protection analysis, given the 
unusual and conspicuous manner in which the Court intermingled the 
                                                 
 188. Id. at 119. 
 189. Id. at 118. 
 190. See id. at 11819. 
 191. Young, Defining Rights, supra note 5, at 40. 
 192. Young & Blondel, supra note 187, at 118. 
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abstractions.  It is, after all, the method actually used, not the latent possibilities, 
that has drawn charges of nonsense from many commenters.193 
For example, Young and Blondel argue that “[t]he Court decided Windsor 
primarily on the ground that DOMA lacked any legitimate federal interest.”194  
That is, while under “traditional rational basis review” the Court does not usually 
“hold the legislature to its actual purpose as long as some possible basis justifies 
the law,”195 “[f]ederalism . . . helps explain why the Court limited its review to 
DOMA’s actual purpose” of asserting a moral position on marriage.196  Thus, as 
the argument goes, the fact that Congress’ actual purpose implicated marriage 
policy—the traditional turf of the states—had the effect of intensifying the equal 
protection scrutiny the Court applied. 
The problem, however, is one that Young and Blondel anticipate but never 
fully confront: coherent precedent already calls for a consideration of actual 
purposes under rational basis review when laws discriminating against 
homosexuals are involved.  In Romer v. Evans,197  the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a Colorado state constitutional amendment that forbade 
localities from enacting legislation protective of homosexuals.198  In allegedly 
applying rational basis review, the Court dismissed theoretically conceivable 
interests of the state in passing the amendment, and concluded that its actual 
purpose was to create a “classification of persons . . . for its own sake,” based 
on animus toward that group.199 
Romer provides an obviously available and precedential basis for inquiry into 
actual purposes.  Young and Blondel provide little reason to conclude that 
federalism concerns provoked this aggressive inquiry rather than the fact that 
DOMA was a law that discriminated against homosexuals “for its own sake,” 
based on animus toward them as a class.200  Their response, judging from their 
article, would be that the Court’s repeated allusion to federalism principles 
makes this apparent: “each time that Kennedy mentioned dignity, he emphasized 
that this was a relationship [that] the State has sought to dignify. Each of the 
burdens that he cited deprived same-sex couples of state-law rights and 
                                                 
 193. See, e.g., Tara Helfman, A Ruling Without Reason, COMMENT. (June 6, 2013, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/06/26/a-ruling-without-reason/ (“In a 26-page 
opinion brimming with constitutional catch phrases but containing no coherent rationale, the Court 
delivered an outcome that many find politically favorable but that no serious reader could possibly 
find legally sound.”). 
 194. Young & Blondel, supra note 187, at 142. 
 195. Id. at 138. 
 196. Id. at 140. 
 197. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 198. Id. at 62324. 
 199. Id. at 635. 
 200. This, in turn, demonstrates why a traditional equal protection analysis would have been a 
more coherent avenue for disposition, as well as one more grounded in precedent.  See Young & 
Blondel, supra note 187, at 139. 
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responsibilities.” 201   But highlighting the fact that the Court emphasized 
federalism loops back only to the obvious fact that the Court indeed repeatedly 
and methodically did so.  Unanswered is the question of why it did so—which 
re-begs the question of how Young and Blondel’s proffered explanation is more 
plausible than others’.  Because the Court, in light of Romer, did not need to rely 
on federalism principles in order to justify inquiry into actual purposes, their 
argument is unpersuasive.202 
The specific manner in which Young and Blondel allege federalism animated 
the Court’s analysis is made less convincing given that they do not make it 
altogether clear how DOMA, as they put it, “intruded on the states’ sovereign 
authority to define marriage for themselves.”203  And, indeed, this is where the 
alternative reading of Windsor proposed herein surfaces, for Young and 
Blondel’s analytical approach illustrates the need to adapt to conceptual 
mutations prompted by Court creativity, rather than to stretch traditional 
frameworks to translate that creativity into a familiar language. 
The closest Young and Blondel come to explaining the alleged “intrusion” on 
state sovereignty is their highlighting of various inconveniences suffered by the 
states in complying with DOMA. 204   For example, “DOMA required state 
officials to disregard state law when administering federal programs.  State 
officials administering veterans’ cemeteries, for example, had to exclude 
veterans’ same-sex spouses in spite of state law.” 205   As another example, 
“DOMA interfered with implementing and enforcing state law itself and 
imposed substantial costs on the states.  For example, it made spousal-support 
                                                 
 201. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 202. This problem also infects Young’s argument that Windsor merely reflects—albeit 
implicitly—the widely accepted notion that equal protection analysis “require[s] governments to 
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state as much, instead opting to repeatedly and vaguely reference state sovereignty, would seem all 
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so in Windsor.  See text accompanying supra notes 19293.  Thus, Professor Randy Barnett appears 
to disagree with Young’s “borrowing” premise.  See Barnett, supra note 169 (asserting that the 
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interest that justifies subjecting a federal law to heightened scrutiny.  This is not how the doctrine 
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 203. Young & Blondel, supra note 187, at 118. 
 204. Id. at 131. 
 205. Id. 
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orders between same-sex couples unenforceable in bankruptcy”206 and the like.  
It is not obvious that—nor even apparent how—these intersections of federal 
and state law amount to federal “intrusion” on state sovereign policy choices.  
Federal and state law interact regularly, and Young and Blondel provide no 
precedential support for the idea that such interactions categorically amount to 
federal “usurpation.” 
The point is not that Young and Blondel are wrong to focus on DOMA’s 
purposes in characterizing how federalism inspired the Court’s equal protection 
analysis; this article after all does the same thing.  In this sense, they are correct 
in disagreeing with the excessively dismissive criticism that the opinion 
amounted to only meaningless “‘blather about traditional state sovereignty and 
marriage.’”207  But they go to the opposite extreme with their formalism.  Where 
their analysis seemingly fails is in concluding that DOMA’s purpose was 
problematic because it, under a traditional conception of federalism and what 
federalism violations look like, interfered with New York’s regulatory 
sovereignty.208  If we take a different approach and keep Windsor’s federalism 
as we find it—as least as much as we can while making sense of it—it is best 
characterized as an expressive answer to an expressive problem created by 
Congress: a formal flouting of the states’ moral authority. 
2.  Shelby County v. Holder and “Equal Sovereignty” 
Shelby County reveals itself to be an example of penumbral federalism in 
action in much the same way Windsor does: through a focus not only on Court 
language but also through the tacit rejection of prudential approaches more 
analytically forceful and rooted in precedent, in favor of question-begging 
federalism conceptualizing. 
In Shelby County, the Court addressed the continuing validity of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA).209  The VRA, passed pursuant to Congress’ authority to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,210 regulates the states’ management of their 
elections to ensure state laws do not impede voting on the basis of race or 
                                                 
    206.    Id. 
 207. Young, Defining Rights, supra note 5, at 46 (quoting Sandy Levinson, A Brief Comment 
on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013), http://balkin. 
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Comment]). 
 208. Young & Blondel, supra note 187, at 118. 
 209. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder (Shelby County), 133 S. Ct. 2612, 262122 (2013). 
 210. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States 
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systemically disable racial minorities from electing their preferred candidates.211  
Important for present purposes are two provisions of the VRA. 
First, Section 5 of the VRA required that states “pre-clear” changes to their 
election laws with the U.S. Attorney General before these laws could go into 
effect.212  The original reason for this remedy made perfect sense when the VRA 
was enacted, and it arguably still does: the standard remedy of enforcement 
through private suit was inadequate in light of the costs and time necessary to 
fully and effectively pursue such litigation.213 
Second, Section 4 of the VRA established the geographical “coverage” of the 
VRA’s pre-clearance provision. 214   Because the problem of race-based 
disenfranchisement was heavily concentrated in the southern states when the 
VRA was originally enacted in 1965, the most aggressive provisions of the law, 
including the preclearance requirement, only covered those states.215 
The problem in Shelby County was that Congress had not, since 1965, 
reevaluated whether changed circumstances brought the original coverage 
formula out of sync with the otherwise legitimate purpose of the statute.216  
According to the Court, continued reliance on forty year-old data made the 
coverage formula in Section 4 “irrational,”217 and thus unequal treatment of the 
states based on such data was a violation of the “principle of equal 
sovereignty.”218  This means, according to the Court, that pre-clearance was not 
a valid exercise of Congress’ power to “enforce” the Fifteenth Amendment with 
                                                 
 211. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)). 
 212. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439. 
 213. As the Court noted in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, wherein the Court originally upheld 
the VRA: 
Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 
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 214. § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438, invalidated by Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
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 218. Id. at 2623 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“appropriate” legislation, a power Section 2 of the Amendment expressly grants 
Congress.219 
As discussed below, the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” was not 
necessary to the Court’s decision.  Regardless, the phraseology is there, and very 
deliberately so; which begs the question of why.  Given that the Court 
prominently showcased equal sovereignty to justify the outcome, scholars 
predictably focused on the legitimacy of it as a “fundamental principle.”  They 
were virtually unanimous in their rejection of equal sovereignty as a legitimate 
and controlling aspect of either the Court’s federalism jurisprudence or the 
meaning of the Constitution as an original matter.220  No doubt, scholars and 
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent were right to note the disingenuousness of the 
majority’s suggestion that equal sovereignty has long been recognized as a 
“fundamental principle” in the Court’s case law.  But most commenters went 
further. 
According to a vast majority of commenters, equal sovereignty as a 
constitutional rule was implausible and the product of rhetorical trickery.  For 
example, Sanford Levinson accused Chief Justice Roberts of basing his analysis 
on nothing more than the fact that “he, as a legislator, would not have joined 
Congress’s overwhelming 2006” renewal of the VRA.221  Professor Richard 
Hasen accused the majority of “hid[ing] behind a cloak of judicial minimalism,” 
and characterized Roberts as a “patient man playing a long game[,]”222 leaving 
the reader to cynically wander through the darker possibilities in determining 
what exactly the “game” is.  According to Hasen, the majority issued an 
“audacious opinion that ignored history”223 and was “nefarious” in avoiding 
answering certain doctrinally important questions.224  Conservatives ready to 
defend the Court’s reasoning were hard to find.225  Richard Posner announced 
that the Shelby County ruling was “about the conservative imagination,” 
declaring that the equal sovereignty principle was a “principle of constitutional 
law of which I had never heard—for the excellent reason that . . . there is no 
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such principle.”226  According to Posner, “apart from the spurious principle of 
equal sovereignty, all that the majority had on which to base its decision was 
tenderness for ‘states’ rights’”: “there is no doctrine of equal sovereignty. The 
opinion rests on air.”227  As such, the opinion must have been driven not by a 
concern for “states’ rights in some abstract sense, but for” the policy preferences 
of the majority.228 
Most interesting about these responses is the manner in which the writers 
implicitly framed the underlying legal question, and thus what plausible answers 
may yield from an honest tackling of that question. -Even the relatively 
“conservative” scholars seemed to assume that if a federalism-driven rule or 
principle such as “equal sovereignty” has not either been invoked before by the 
Court, or has no demonstrable role in the political theory musings of the 
founding generation, its validity is highly suspect, as are the intentions of those 
who invoke it.  Hence responses like Eric Posner’s, charging that the notion of 
equal sovereignty is a “newly invented idea” and “a joke” in a “pretty lame” 
opinion,229  or that the majority engaged in nothing but legislating from the 
bench.230 
These reactions reflect prevailing expectations of what federalism reasoning 
is supposed to look like.  But, using the penumbral lens, the majority’s reasoning 
in Shelby County can be read without much imagination as embodying a genuine 
belief about how federalism principles compelled the outcome obtained.  A 
belief that federalism and the Tenth Amendment are quintessentially about not 
only the division of regulatory power but also about maintaining the states as 
viable competitors for citizens’ respect and loyalty, must make unequal 
burdening of the states by Congress at least preliminarily problematic, even if 
reasonable people can disagree about the ultimate propriety of such unequal 
treatment in specific contexts. 
Besides the Court’s unembarrassed invocation of the ethereal federalism 
abstraction of “equal sovereignty,” other aspects of the opinion support the 
characterization of the opinion as falling on the penumbral federalism trendline.  
Most conspicuous is the fact that the Court did not need to rely on equal 
sovereignty in order to reach its conclusion.  In fact, the two most obvious 
alternate routes would not only have more closely paralleled precedent and 
                                                 
 226. Richard A. Posner, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 
12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/ 
supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_
all.html. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Eric Posner, John Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE (June 
25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/ 
features/2013/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice_john
_roberts_struck.html. 
 230. See Levinson, supra note 28. 
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constitutional text, but also would have allowed the Court to go farther than it 
did and strike down preclearance altogether.  A brief discussion of these 
alternatives, and the fact that the Court rejected them, helps to highlight how 
conspicuous it is that the Court chose to emphasize equal sovereignty, and thus 
underscores how that emphasis represents a conceptual priority in the minds of 
the majority justices. 
Again, Congress passed the VRA pursuant to its power under Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.  After providing in Section 1 that states may not deny or 
abridge the right to vote on the basis of race, the Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  
Since, theoretically at least, Congress can only exercise enumerated powers, it 
follows that if any provision of the VRA is not “appropriate” to “enforce” 
Section 1 as the terms are used in the Amendment, it is unconstitutional.  Thus, 
much of the debate before and after Shelby County revolved around the 
contextual meaning of the terms “appropriate” and “enforce.”231 
Unsurprisingly, then, the interpretive question is crucial primarily because the 
correct answer determines the deference level with which courts should 
approach questions of congressional power in the Reconstruction Amendment 
context.  Some argue that the “appropriate/enforce” language triggers the same 
degree of congressional latitude as does the Necessary and Proper Clause with 
regard to Article I powers,232 which according to recent jurisprudence is an 
extremely forgiving rationality analysis.233  Indeed, the Court itself in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,234 in upholding the original VRA, squarely asserted 
that “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting.”235 
This leads to easy-way-out number one. Recall that the Court in Shelby 
County characterized Congress’ reliance on forty year-old data as “irrational.”236  
                                                 
 231. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 232. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 181011 
(2010) (arguing that the enforcement provisions under the Reconstruction Amendments were 
intended to bestow on Congress the same breadth of power granted under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause).  Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5 – and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 109, 113 (2013) (arguing that it would be ironic to view the VRA’s coverage provision 
as unconstitutional in light of the coercive and unequal conditions under which the former-
Confederate states ratified the Reconstruction Amendments and rejoined the Union). 
 233. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“[W]e look to see whether the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”). 
 234. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 235. Id. at 324. 
 236. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (noting “the irrationality 
of continued reliance on the § 4 coverage formula”); id. at 263031 (“It would have been irrational 
for Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data.”). 
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Not only did the Court repeatedly use rationality terminology, it expressly gave 
a nod to Katzenbach’s use of the deferential rationality standard.237  In other 
words, the Court implicitly applied the weaker rationality standard and 
concluded—with references to “equal sovereignty” intermingled—that the 
coverage provision failed this relatively forgiving standard. 
This begs the question of why, if the Court felt it could plausibly conclude 
that reliance on the coverage formula was irrational, it employed the concept of 
equal sovereignty at all.  What analytical umph did the majority believe the 
concept contributed? Given the concept’s lack of pedigree as truly a 
“fundamental principle,” the best answer is none.  The Court did not depend on 
the equal sovereignty principle for its decision.  Rather than logically leading to 
the rationality conclusion, the equal sovereignty principle is there to highlight 
what important values the rationality conclusion serves: it expresses the value of 
state dignity, which, absent a good justification, is “offended” by federal 
discriminatory treatment.  Thus, unless we are to conclude that the equal 
sovereignty principle is there for essentially no reason, its function is easy to 
frame as an expression of the doctrinal importance of the penumbral values the 
Tenth Amendment implicitly makes important.238 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Court rejected the other 
available alternative, one that would have made its judgment significantly more 
aligned with precedent than coupling the rationality standard with the seemingly 
atmospheric equal sovereignty principle.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,239 the 
Court held that under the Fourteenth Amendment, use of the term “enforcement” 
means that Congress has no authority to create new substantive rights, but rather 
can only pass laws that are “congruent and proportional” to the substantive right 
already guaranteed in Section 1.240  Those supporting Shelby County, in turn, 
                                                 
 237. Id. at 2627 (citing Katzenbach after asserting that “[w]hen upholding the constitutionality 
of the coverage formula in 1966, we concluded that it was ‘rational in both practice and theory’”). 
 238. It should be noted that the Court cited to its prior decision in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), as precedential support for equal 
sovereignty being a “fundamental principle.”  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 203.  Of course, this is 
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precedent.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion in Northwest Austin, and he wrote the Shelby 
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described equal sovereignty as a “fundamental principle” in prior decisions.  The majority—headed 
by Roberts in both cases—clearly invoked equal sovereignty because they thought it conceptually 
important to the decisions, not because they believed it was a controlling principle per precedent. 
 239. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 240. Id. at 520. 
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borrowed this reasoning from Boerne and applied it to the Fifteenth 
Amendment,241 which makes perfect sense given that the remedial provisions in 
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, while not identical, employ 
identical operative terms (“enforce” and “appropriate”).242   Thus, given the 
outcome in Shelby County, one would have expected the Roberts Court to take 
the predictable and arguably logical step of noting that Boerne overruled 
Katzenbach, and therefore that heightened scrutiny was appropriate in the 
Fifteenth Amendment context as well.  In fact, this was such an obvious path for 
the Court to take243 that some commentators assumed that was the path taken 
after reading the opinion, even though the Court conspicuously avoided 
resolving the issue.244 
This leads to easy-way-out number two: assert that Boerne required 
application of the congruent-and-proportional standard to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and hold that the coverage provision, if not irrational, is at least a 
non-congruent and disproportional remedy relative to the substantive guarantees 
of the Fifteenth Amendment.  The Court’s rejection of this obvious path of least 
resistance suggests that its invocation of equal sovereignty was quite purposeful, 
even if not analytically forceful.  If that invocation was purposeful, its purpose 
was justificatory.  Viewing the equal sovereignty principles as playing this role 
in the Court’s opinion helps make sense of it as a larger pattern of focusing on 
state dignity as an interest to protect through judicial vigilance.  It thus indicates 
an increasing willingness to invoke penumbral values in animating its federalism 
jurisprudence. 
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Id.  This not to suggest that Adler was incorrect; one can certainly read the opinion as effectively 
making the Boerne standard operative in the Fifteenth Amendment context. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
The less willing the Court is inclined to enforce structural principles, the more 
willing it is to exalt those principles in its opinions.245  Even those who wished 
otherwise readily admit that the federalism-sympathetic justices are, at the end 
of the day, too pragmatic to take dual federalism decisions like Lopez and 
Morrison to their logical and principled ends. -What results from this 
pragmatism, combined with a sense of duty to protect, and reverence toward, 
structural principles, are exaltation of them and a focus on the structural benefits 
such exaltation may yield. 
The ultimate lesson from viewing the decisions discussed above through the 
lens of penumbral federalism is to consider that, while they at close-up may seem 
like examples of abject conservative activism, from the 10,000-foot view they 
are perhaps part of a pragmatic shift in federalism framing by the Court.  For 
this reason, scholars should keep their peripheral vision sharp and fight the 
temptation to dismiss penumbral rhetoric in the federalism context as cheap 
rhetorical trickery or the product of ungrounded exaltation of founding-era 
priorities.  Rather, if scholars are to maintain a complete understanding of how 
federalism influences the judicial mind and the outcomes of cases, what is 
needed is an increasing sensitivity to both the fact of penumbral framing—
manifest either through allusions or blatant declarations—as well as to the 
possible reasons why the Court approaches a particular federalism issue using 
such a framing. 
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